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I. INTRODUCTION
A songwriter may insist on being "a rock, ... an island"
in order to "feel no pain and .. never cry." ' Ecology, however,
teaches that not only is no person an island, but no island is an
island. Activity on any land impacts either other land or related
* Maria E. Mansfield is an Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director
National Energy Law and Policy Institute, University of Tulsa, 3120 E. Fourth Place,
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104.
** Views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those
of the National Energy Law and Policy Institute.
I "I Am A Rock", copyright 1965 by Paul Simon.
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resources of water or air. Physical reality tempers a claim to
"free use, enjoyment, and disposal" 2 of so-called private prop-
erty. Law reflects this bond by regulating private activity for the
common good. 3 One vivid example is the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).
4
The Act attempts to comprehensively address the externalities
of surface mining.5 Permits would precede mining to impose
detailed performance standards. 6 Moreover, Congress declared
an outright ban on surface mining in certain situations. 7 Section
522(e) of SMCRA specifically exempts existing mines and "valid
existing rights" ("VER") from these prohibitions.'
If valid existing rights exist, the bans on mining in Section
522(e) of SMCRA do not apply. The proponent of mining will
"win," but only so far as gaining the right to seek a permit,
2 W. Blackstone, 2 Commentaries 2 (W. Lewis ed. 1898):
The right of property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe. It consists in the free
use, enjoyment, and.disposal of all a person's acquisitions, without any
control or diminution save only by the laws of the land.
I As Professor Cribbet aptly put it, Blackstone's definition of property is still
alive and relevant: "If one de-emphasizes 'sole and despotic' and emphasizes 'save only
by the laws of the land,' Blackstone's words approach the modern concept of prop-
erty...". Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 ILL. L. REV. 1, 39. See also, Cribbet, at 25-26 ("The net effect of police power
regulations, environmental law, and public trust doctrines has been to make many
decisions [on private land use] joint ventures between the individual and the state.").
4 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter SMCRA],
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
1 Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of
1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 553 (1979); Harris & Close, Redefining the State
Regulatory Role, 12 ENVTL. L. 921, 923 (1982) (weak and ineffectual state programs
impetus for Act).
6 SMCRA § 515, 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (1988). Some aspects of underground mining
are also regulated. SMCRA § 516, 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1988).
' These include lands within National Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, Wilder-
nesses, or National Forests as well as operations that would impact publicly owned parks
or historic sites or come within certain distances of public roads, occupied dwellings,
public buildings, churches, or cemeteries. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
Other prohibitions forbid mining on certain alluvial valley floors in western states, with
the exception of mines that produced coal in commercial quantities in the preceding year
or had obtained a permit. Id. at § 510(b)(5). Other areas may be declared unsuitable
for surface mining, with mining prohibited except when permitted, existing, or where
"substantial legal and financial commitments" had been made. Id. at §§ 512(b) and
522(a)(6). See generally, McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon Revisited:
Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an Uncon-
stitutional Taking, 16 TULSA L.J. 418, 421-24 (1981).
1 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
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which may or may not be granted based on other preconditions. 9
Congress meant something, however, by its language granting
exemptions to more than existing mines. The Department of
Interior has grappled with the meaning of VER for many years. 0
Currently, three main contenders lead the definition fight.
All require the claimant to prove ownership of the coal resource,
but each requires a different additional proof:
1. A modified "all permits" test requires the applicant to have
received all necessary permits or have made a "good faith"
effort to receive them."
2. An "authority to mine test" requires proof that the appli-
cant had a right pursuant to state law to mine the property by
the proposed method.'
2
3. A "takings" test requires that the applicant show that to
deny the right to mine would violate the Fifth Amendment.'
An additional test, however, would supplement the basic tests
and exempt coal needed for the continuing viability of a mine 4
I Valley Camp Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, 112 I. B.L.A. 19, 36-37
(Nov. 16, 1989) (must still meet permit requirements).
10 Briefly, it first required "all permits" to have been received. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342
(1979), 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1980). The District Court recognized a "good faith" effort.
In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1083,
1091 (D. D.C. 1980) (Hereinafter "In Re F') A proposed regulation was then promul-
gated with this test and others. 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,279 (1982). Interior adopted a
"takings" test as a final rule. 48 Fed. Reg. at 41,398 (1983), 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984).
It was overturned on procedural grounds: it varied too greatly from the proposed rule.
In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1557 (D.
D.C. 1985) (Hereinafter "In Re ir'). See generally, Note, Regulation and Land With-
drawals: Defining "Valid Existing Rights", 3 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 517, 519-24 (1988);
McFerrin & Whitman, Valid Existing Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory
Changes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 648-51 (1985).
,1 In conformity with In Re I, this test was adopted as an interim rule when later
rulemaking was invalidated. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,954, 54-55 (1982). Reproposed as an option
in the 1988 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988) (hereinafter
"1988 Proposal"), withdrawn for further consideration, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1989).
11 Proposed as an option in the 1988 Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988),
withdrawn for further consideration, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1989). Whether the "author-
ity" must specify a mining method or simply distinguish surface, or other subsidence-
causing methods, from traditional underground mining is disputed.
.3 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984), suspended, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,960 (1986). This test was
not in the 1988 Proposal.
'1 See, In Re I, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1091. The rationale was to avoid making
existing mines uneconomical, a potentiality that could be a "taking" under certain
theories. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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that existed on the relevant date.'5 None of the basic tests are
sufficient.
First, the exception for VER occurs in a section designed to
protect certain lands even more greatly than the permitting sys-
tem would allow.' 6 Congress could not have meant that each
and every private party "owning" coal could develop the same. 
7
Having the right to develop the mineral under state law must be
a precondition for any permit under the Act. The SMCRA was
not meant to increase the rights of a miner vis a vis other private
parties'8 or state regulations.' 9
Second, the Act elsewhere declares that it is to be taken to
the constitutional limit. 20 If the provision merely is inserted to
prevent a taking, it is superfluous.2' More importantly, it would
11 The relevant date is when SMCRA was passed for proposed mines affected by
conditions that existed then. For conditions occurring later, the date is when the condition
came into existence. This leads to a "continually created" VER tied to creation of new
forbidding situations, such as newly occupied dwellings. National Wildlife Federation v.
Hodel, 839 F. 2d 694, 748-50 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concept upheld).
16 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1988). Cf, National Wildlife Federation,
839 F.2d at 748, interpreting provision on "unsuitability" to require "balancing the
financial interests of the mine operators against the public's interest in prohibiting mining
where it is environmentally unsuitable."
,7 Cogar v. Faerber, 371 S.E.2d 321, 324 (W.Va. 1988) (lease acquisition insuffi-
cient under state counterpart); Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference with Private
Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 60 n. 332 (1987). But see
Professor Laitos' contribution to this VER Symposium issue.
11 At a minimum, this is the import of congressional declarations that SMCRA
was not to change existing rights. E.g., "Language of 522(e) is in no way intended to
affect or abrogate any previous State court decisions," H.R. REp. No. 1522, 93rd Cong,
2nd Sess. 85 (1974). Reference was made to United States v. Polino, 131 F.Supp. 772
(N.D. W.Va. 1955). This case merely employed West Virginia law to determine if a
reservation of minerals in a deed to the United States included the right to strip mine
coal. The court held it did not. Id. at 776-77. See also, United States v. Sterns Co., 595
F. Supp. 808, 811-13 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (employing Kentucky law in similar situation).
Compare, National Wildlife Federation v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 850 F.2d
694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(state law defines reversionary interest); Sierra Club v. Hodel,
848 F.2d 1068, 1079-83 (10th Cir. 1988) (state law sets scope of right-of-way).
9 SMCRA does not preempt more stringent state regulation. SMCRA § 505(b),
30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (1988). It can, however, impose greater restrictions on mining to
benefit surface owners. SMCRA § 102(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(b). See, National Wildlife
Fed. v. Lujan, 733 F. Supp. 419, 426 (D.D.C. 1990) (" '[Flully protected' means just
that, not fully protected to the extent state law provides.").
10 SMCRA § 102(m), 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (m): "It is the purpose of this Act to ...
wherever necessary, exercise the full reach of Federal constitutional powers to insure the
protection of the public interest through effective control of surface coal mining oper-
ations." See, In Re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 520-21
(D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. den., 454 U.S. 822 (1981) (federal standards and oversight needed).
1, Cf., Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 544 (1922) (VER in withdrawal
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not reflect congressional desire to exempt more than existing
mines. Current takings jurisprudence allows vigorous regulation
of diffuse externalities.2 2 "Takings" of mineral interests would
be rare and the test would grant little or no protection for
private developers. Rather than balancing interests, environmen-
tal protection would silence all other equities.
Neither of these tests respond to the objectives of Section
522(e)'s VER exception. The answer must lie in between the
"takings" test, which creates a non-existent exemption, and the
ownership and authority to mine test, which is non-prohibitive.
The "all permits test," however, is too restrictive. It is also not
"compelled either by the statutory language or its legislative
history.' '23
Takings jurisprudence does provide a key to help define
VER: focus on reasonable expectation of development. 24 Al-
though, broadly speaking, no mineral owner prior to SMCRA
could have expected an unfettered right to develop, particular-
izing this inquiry could define valid rights to proceed with reg-
ulation. How strong must the expectation be to be a valid
existing right? A crystaline act must objectify the expectation,
but clear cut rules may be impossible to draw.
2
1
An objective or "strong" expectations test would require
some act in addition to ownership of coal to show anticipation
of actual mining in the reasonably near future. At one extreme,
analogy to vested right law in the zoning context would have
order "means something less than a vested right, such as would follow from a completed
final entry, since such a right would require no exception to insure its preservation").
See, infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. For an argument that existing
private arrangements would prevent externalities better than regulatory attempts, see,
Huffman, The Allocative Impacts of Mineral Severance: Implications for the Regulation
of Surface Mining, 22 NAT. REs. J. 201 (1982).
23 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 296 n.
37 (1981). See also, Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, S.D. Ohio No. C-2-88-0416, slip
op. (June 2, 1988) (test creates unconstitutional taking).
2' Cf., In Re 1I, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1091:
The government avers that the all permits test ensures consonance with the
taking cases. It requires an operator to expend a sizeable investment, and
possess a substantial expectation of mining, in order to qualify for a valid
existing right. This rationale is self defeating. Surely an operator who
applies for all permits, but fails to receive one through governmental delay,
engenders the same investment and expectations as an operator who timely
receives all permits.
25 Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). See
infra note 122.
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this occur when the private party had done everything necessary
to proceed under prior law. It would then be inequitable to
change the rules of the game. 26 A good faith attempt to get all
permits would therefore suffice.
However, strong expectations may attach before reaching the
permit stage. Permit acquisition would indicate an immediate
desire to mine and less instant development plans may be pro-
tectible. Substantial financial or legal investments reveal actual
intent to mine a specific deposit. Congress uses this test elsewhere
in the Act. 27 Although general rules of statutory interpretation
point to treating the two formulations differently 2 s such com-
mitments could be elements of proof under the strong expecta-
tions test.
Under this test, what governs is the fact that a reasonable
person anticipated being able to mine the specific deposit, albeit
not free and clear of all regulatory constraints. Although the
test looks to subjective expectations, they must be manifested
by objective evidence. Proof of this expectation must be strong
and show plans to mine in the reasonably foreseeable future.
II. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE REVIEWED
A. Background: Constitutional Contours
The Fifth Amendment provides that no "private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. ' 29 The
6 Barkeley & Albert, A Survey of Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing Rights"
- Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-85 -
9-87 (1988). Use of "vested" rights in this manner should not be confused with "vested
right" analysis vis-a-vis changes in laws dealing with acquisition or regulation of federal
resources. In the latter sense, vested rights include fee title, equitable rights to fee title,
and issued leases. See Laitos & Westfall, supra note 17, at 12-13; infra notes 182-187
and accompanying text.
21 SMCRA § 522(a)(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (a)(6)(1988) (requires both when areas are
designated unsuitable for surface mining).
11 Cogar, 371 S.E.2d at 325. The Department of the Interior has taken inconsistent
positions on the relationship between the two provisions. First, it felt that VER under
§ 552(e) must be stricter than substantial financial or legal commitments. 44 Fed. Reg.
14,991-92 (1979). Later, it found that the two provisions were "separate and distinct."
48 Fed. Reg. 41,316 (1983).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also, "No person shall be . . . deprived of ...
property without due process of law." Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of property, without due process of law." "Due
process" limits actions in regard to property in addition to the prohibition against taking
without compensation.
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word "taken" could have one uncomplicated meaning: govern-
ment simply cannot acquire land or personal property without
paying for it) 0 The prohibition against "takings," however,
attacks two additional problems that may range beyond direct
government acquisitions. 31 In the first, to "take" involves a
physical occupation of land, which relates to the initial thrust
of the provision.32 Moreover, in some circumstances, less than
either entry or acquisition of title could trigger the just compen-
sation requirement: a regulation may too greatly impede private
rights to be allowable." This sparks the "regulatory taking"
issue.
" Cf., Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1697, 1702-05 (1988) (compensate only for improvements government will use).
Despite the initial attractiveness of a literal reading, the provision has not been interpreted
so narrowly. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123
n.25 (1978) (taking not limited to physical transfers of property). See also, Id. at 143
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Because destruction equates easily with physical appropriation
of land, compensation for destroyed property was a natural progression. Pumpelly v
Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
1, Defining the issue as property "appropriated" can lead to word play: a restriction
on use could "appropriate" a negative easement. See, Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1186-87 (1967). See also, Laitos, Regulation of Natural Resources
Use and Development in Light of the "New" Takings Clause, 34 RocKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 1-1, 1-17 - 1-23 (1988). This definitional tendency fuels some Justices' concern
about compensating for easement acquisition. See infra, notes 99-101.
12 Permanent entry on someone's land, either by the government itself or the public,
under current rules may require compensation even if the intrusion is de minimus. E.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Judlo v. Vons
Companies, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 259 Cal. Rptr. 624 (Cal. App. 1989); but see,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980) (entry into shopping
center literal but not constitutional taking). See also, Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1603 (1988) (moving toward per se rule); Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 28-29,
44 (1985) ("mechanical" permanent physical occupation test similar to formal eminent
domain, reflects low transaction costs, and resembles "dimensional" test for trespass
and nuisance distinction); and Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 511 (1983) (Loretto is aberrational).
11 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); but see, Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887):
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or
an appropriation of property for the public benefit.
These potentially inconsistent positions thread through takings jurispudence. They are
not, however, necessarily inconsistent. See infra, notes 44-73 and accompanying text;
Costonis, supra note 32, at 497 n. 126; McGinley & Barrett, supra note 7, at 436-37.
For arguments that these cases are incompatible, see Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36, 41 (1964) (hereinafter, Sax I) and Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings,
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Two inquiries compose the general question of whether a
"regulatory taking" exists. First, as with all government actions,
a threshold of legitimacy is necessary: the regulation must be a
valid exercise of the police power or other enumerated power.
3 4
The central query in regulatory taking analysis, however, is
whether the particular landowner should receive compensation
because of the interference with property use.35 A more precise
rendition of the problem would be, "Has this landowner been
disproportionately burdened? "36
Neither traditional glosses to this question nor modern re-
finements provide rigid rules. Nor should inflexibility be sought:
"just compensation" requirements respond to the "expecta-
tions" that currently govern property rights or the process would
not be "just." Although there is some constitutional core to the
term "property," rights are not frozen. Protection aligns with
societal needs and understandings through a process of evolu-
tionary, as opposed to revolutionary, change."
Two strands of existing case law coalesce to allow mining
prohibitions under SMCRA to survive takings challenges. First
is the nature of the government action. The Act seeks to protect
collective values such as basic environmental amenities. Similar
goals have received respect in the past. The public rights vindi-
cated are in a category of regulation requiring less scrutiny to
survive a takings challenge.3 9 Secondly, existing regulatory con-
and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1980). See also, Florida Rock
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Pennsylvania Coal
breaks with precedent finding a regulation can never be a taking).
31 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 308
(1981)(Commerce Clause authorizes).
" A unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit interference with property rights, but conditions the interference on providing
compensation. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, -U.S. -, 110
S.Ct. 914 (1990) (no taking if Tucker Act available for compensation). Although unan-
imous on this point, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy provided a concurring
opinion. See infra, note 115.
36 See, generally, Michelman, supra note 31 and Costonis, supra note 32.
" PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 92-93 (Marshall, J. concurring): "Indeed, the great
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances," quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 134 (1877). State law may provide some definitions of property, but it, too, is not
static.
11 See Udall, supra note 5; National Wildlife Fed. v. Lujan, 773 F. Supp. at 426
(SMCRA goes beyond environmental concerns to ease hardships caused by coal mining).
11 Regulation of "collective impinging" activity requires less deference to private
use of property. See, Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public
[VOL. 5:431
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trol of mining should have influenced and limited the private
owner's expectations about development. What is reasonable to
have expected in regard to property development is a crucial
element of takings analysis.
Nevertheless, if an affected interest had no opportunity to
spread the risk of regulatory control, finding a taking may be
appropriate to approximate fairness. Current law could distin-
guish between parties by appraising the "property affected"
broadly to include all that the complaining party controls. There-
fore, disproportionate harm may be avoided while not overtaxing
the public's ability to either compensate, or, in the present
situation, find a VER.
B. Traditional Takings Tests
Regulatory takings are controversial because many times the
overall social good could not be increased if everyone negatively
impacted must receive full compensation. Overburdensome tax-
ation would foreclose many clearly efficient actions, that is,
actions with benefits exceeding the costs of their impacts. 4° Nev-
ertheless, the classic liberal definition of property demands rec-
ognition. Property in this view requires individual control of the
possession, use and disposition of an object. 41 The disparate tugs
Land Law, 17 ECOL. L.Q. -(1990). The label may clarify the well-known "benefit
versus harm" calculus by identifying the property to which the calculus must be applied.
See infra, notes 49-59 and accompanying text. Although Section 552(e) protects federal
property such as parks and wildlife refuges, it also protects private residences. Protecting
private property does promote the public interest, but federal property may deserve
greater protection because it can serve uniquely collective needs. Interior requested
comments on this possibility in the 1988 Proposal. For other distinctions between types
of property and protective level, see infra, note 102.
,o Cost and trouble in tracing impacts influence takings decisions, see Michelman,
supra note 31, at 1178-79; Merrill, supra note 32, at 14. Cf., Sax, Property Rights in
the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 139, 153
(1988) (hereinafter Sax 1987) (regulations redistribute wealth because government is
responsible party of last resort). But see, Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through
the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work,
3 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. LAW 171, 210 (1987) (those desiring nondevelopment should
pay) and Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (1989) (inappropriate to protect "unless and until" too
expensive).
4 United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945) (property "denote[s]
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right
to possess, use and dispose of it.") For explication of the "liberal" concept of property,
see, e.g., Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurispru-
dence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988); Epstein, Takings: Descent and
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of "property," social thought and practicality require reconci-
lation.
1. The "Too Far" Test and its Limited Application
One classic attempt to reconcile these discordant influences
found refuge in "enough is enough" and seemingly made taking
partially a matter of degree; regulation under the police power
sometimes would require compensation if too great a diminution
of value resulted:
One fact for consideration in determining such limits [of proper
police power impingement] is the extent of diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there
must be the exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act ... The general rule ... is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking.
42
This is, of course, Justice Holmes's famous pronouncement in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.43 Writing for the Court, he
invalidated a statute that required coal to remain underground
to prevent subsidence of residences and other improvements.
The statute would have precluded mining even if the owner of
the severed mineral had waivers of the right to subjacent sup-
port. 44 Holme's statement recognizes that compensation is not
required whenever value is destroyed, but would be necessary in
Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
A dialectic between two concepts of property permeates American thought. The
Madison/Lockean "liberal" view is that property serves an individual's needs; govern-
ment exists to protect the same. The Jeffersonian/Rouseauan concept imbues property
with a social purpose; through ownership of property a citizen gains values necessary to
participate meaningfully in government. See also, Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles
or Politics?, 34 Burr. L. REv. 735, 754-58 (1985).
42 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
43 Id.
" For an explanation of subjacent support, see Breeding v. Koch Carbon, Inc.,
726 F. Supp. 645, 646-48 (W.D. Va. 1989); see also, Mansfield, supra note 39. Penn-
sylvania's mining prohibition was not absolute. A companion law allowed mining if a
coal company contributed 2% of market value of mined coal to a fund that paid
damages for subsidence. Friedman, A Search For Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon in Context, 4 LAW & HIST. REv. 1, 18-22 (1986) (suggests Holmes thought
general tax more appropriate).
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"most" cases.4 Nevertheless, non-compensable regulatory ac-
tions could go very far in lessening property value. 46
Perhaps the dividing line between requiring and not requiring
compensation is the strength of the public purpose being for-
warded. In the Pennsylvania Coal case, Justice Brandeis dis-
sented vigorously. One striking difference between his opinion
and that of the majority is in characterizing the problem the
statute addressed. Holmes apparently viewed it as a dispute
between the Mahon family and the coal company; Brandeis
envisioned the city of Scranton sliding into a gaping hole.
47
In Pennsylvania Coal, the majority's basic concern was that
"the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to
warrant such a destruction [of private rights]." The "too much"
or "diminution in value" factor, however, will become irresolute
in three situations: when the prohibited action resembles a nui-
sance, when it would injure core values, and when it would
destroy gains from reciprocal restrictions. These three areas pro-
vide sufficient public interest to avoid the requirement of com-
pensation.
First, traditional nuisance law limits private property rights.
No person may unreasonably use property to the detriment of
neighbors: "all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to
the community. ' 49 This principle provides a perimeter for con-
stitutional safeguards. A regulation forbidding a nuisance simply
4 Compare, a more recent proponent of Holmes' approach, who also excepts from
censure regulations that either prevent discrete noxious activities or grant reciprocal
benefits, Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 105, 144-47 (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 511-
13 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
- In fact, the Supreme Court from 1923 until 1987 never struck down a regulation
as a taking if it did not comprise a physical entry. See, Laitos, supra note 31, at 1-29.
Holmes elsewhere approved legislation that interfered with either mineral recovery or
contracts, see Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531
(1914); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908). See also, Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); and Erie
R.R. v. Board of Public Utility Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921).
47 Compare, the majority and dissenting opinions of Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260
U.S. at 413, with 260 U.S. at 421-22. (Brandeis, J. dissenting). See also, Large, The
Supreme Court and the Taking Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. L. 3,
10-16 (1988) (background of justices' views). For a more modern dilemma, see McCarthy,
Reclaiming Butte: The Doctrine of Subjacent Support, 49 MONT. L. REv. 267 (1988).
41 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
41 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
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implements legislatively what a court could order by equitable
injunction. No compensation would therefore be due. In simple
situations, the distinction between appropriating, such as obtain-
ing sites for highways or post offices, and regulating activities
that unreasonably impinge on neighboring land may give pre-
dictable and non-objectionable results.5 0
A time-honored case embodying this principle involved a
brewery building rendered useless when the state outlawed liquor
manufacture and sale. Justice Harlan's opinion upheld the stat-
ute because prevention of a "noxious use" is inherently different
from a regulation that prohibits an "innocent" use in order to
obtain a public benefit.5 ' Justice Holmes also found this principle
self-evident.12 Regulations that purportedly only prevent detri-
ment and ones that seek gains for the public justify different
impacts on private property.
Naturally, morality and community norms influence what is
labeled "noxious" or detrimental. Standards change through
time and so does legislation reflecting them; breweries exist
again.53 Courts, according to Justice Holmes, must respect the
deliberate pace of this flux:
[T]he extent to which legislation may modify and restrict the
uses of property consistently with the Constitution is not a
question for pure abstract theory alone. Tradition and habits
of the community count for more than logic .... The plaintiff
must wait until there is a change of practice, or at least an
established consensus of civilized opinion, before it can expect
this court to overthrow the values that the law makers and the
court of his own state uphold.
5 4
" See, Sax I, supra note 33. See also, Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means:
Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHNS L.
REV. 433, 459 (1989) (principle essentially sound).
5' Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 286, 384 (1930) (Holmes,
J.) ("when a business is extinguished as noxious under the Constitution the owners
cannot demand compensation from the Government").
1 See, Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak
nor Obtuse, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 1630, 1638 (1988) (nuisance law follows community
norms to be neutral benchmark between benefit and harm); Dowling, General Proposi-
tions and Concrete Cases: The Search for a Standard in the Conflict Between Individual
Property Rights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 353, 367 (1985)
("a charting of the history of the police power parallels a history of general social
attitudes").
51 Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910) (upholds
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Although flexibility through time might not be a fault but a
strength of the test, the distinction between obtaining a benefit
and controlling harm presents other difficulties."
The line between the two types of actions sometimes defies
clear analysis. Benefit and harm may be a matter of perspective.
Brickmaking is not an "evil" occupation but a brickyard in a
residential area damages the values of the houses.16 A rancher
earns a livelihood from cattle. Roaming cattle would not cause
damage if a neighbor did not plant corn. The removal of the
"detriment," namely roaming livestock, benefits the farmer. In
a post-Coasean world, it is often impossible to straightforwardly
declare which of two activities, farming or ranching, is neces-
sarily the nuisance.17 An additional example clarifies both the
weakness and the inherent appeal of the technique. 8
The Psalms laud cedar trees, but if the trees harbor a pest
deadly to neighboring apple orchards, cedars may be destroyed
without compensation. 9 The source of this power is specific: "it
is obvious that there may be, and that here there is, a prepon-
derant public concern in the preservation of the one interest over
the other." 6 Neither tree is noxious or detrimental to man per
se; they are simply incompatible with each other.6' Faced with
this dilemma, the legislature must choose:
ordinance outlawing burial in city despite alleged $2 million cemetery expenditure); see
also, Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) ("If a thing has been practiced
for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth
Amendment to affect it...").
" See generally, Rose-Ackerman, supra note 30, at 1707- 10. But see, Dunham, A
Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 664-65 (1958)
(workable test).
56 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (existing brickyard prohibited as
health hazard despite precipitous drop in value of land. See also, Reinman v. Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (health and comfort of community justified exclusion of lawful
stable from area).
17 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960) (without
transaction costs, markets would foster efficient land use regardless of fault labels); see
also, Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57
(1984).
11 Indeed, Professor Michelman referred to the fault rationale as being "itself an
attractive nuisance." Michelmen, supra note 31, at 1199 n.72.
19 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Chief Justice Rehnquist quibbles that
because the owners could use the fallen trees, all value was not destroyed. Keystone,
480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). But the investment backed expectation of
the owners was not that cedars would be a source of firewood.
'o Miller, 276 U.S. at 279.
" See, e.g., Sax 1, supra note 33, at 49 (many compensation denials involve
inconsistency between perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses).
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It would have been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting
the present statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted
serious injury to the apple orchards within its borders to go
unchecked. When forced to such choice the state does not
exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruc-
tion of one class of property in order to save another which,
in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the
public. It will not do to say that the case is merely one of a
conflict of two private interests .. .62
In the world of Miller v. Schoene, apples were crucial to the
local economy. In some instances, therefore, universal declara-
tions of value are possible. 63 This would be the second instance
of sufficient public interest to justify non-compensable regula-
tion.
Regulation, however, does not limit itself to these clearcut
areas of community concern nor to clearcut nuisances. Under
the due process clause, government may constitutionally regulate
property use under its police power. Lowering the value of
individual property does not negate the power. Due process
simply requires the regulation to have a rational tie to advancing
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.M Public
welfare encompasses "broad and inclusive ' 65 goals. Ascertaining
that the power to act exists, however, does not answer whether
compensation is necessary.
62 Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80. See also, Dowling, supra note 53, at 380 (test useful
in conflicts arising out of nature).
61 The court employed a deferential standard: "we cannot say that ... exercise [of
the police power], controlled by considerations of social policy which are not unreason-
able, involves any denial of due process." Therefore, mere rationality may have sufficed.
Miller, 276 U.S. at 280. The court did, however, emphasize the economic value of
apples. Id. at 279. The decision's tenor justifies categorizing it as one involving strong
policy concerns. See also, Bowdich v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19 (1879) (no
compensation if building destroyed to stop spread of fire); Stoebuck, A General Theory
of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 563-65 (1972) (remnant of king's perogative
power rather than exception to compensation).
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See generally,
Dowling, supra note 53, at 364-69. The federal government, of course, must connect its
activities to an enumerated power. For the SMCRA, this is the Commerce Clause.
6, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954):
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33. See also, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)
("The 'public use' requirement [of the takings clause] is thus coterminous with the scope
of the sovereign's police power".)
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A third way to regulate without compensation occurs when
regulation increases values over-all. Land control can create
value for the whole that would exceed individual parcel valua-
tions if each individual landowner would develop in any way
desired. Validating these regulations echoes the rationale for
enforcing equitable servitudes.6
A focus on overall increased benefits eliminates the need to
identify a "nuisance" or overriding social concern. It recognizes,
as both Justices Holmes and Brandeis did, that there may, in
civilized society, be a "reciprocity of advantage" in regulation.
6
1
Whether the particular statute itself must encompass such reci-
procity or whether it could be found in the wider realm of
regulatory actions is debatable. 68 In essence, if reciprocity exists,
it provides compensation and therefore avoids violating the con-
stitutional command.
These three approaches show that more than simple balanc-
ing between society's gain and the harm to the individual is
needed to validate a regulation that destroys property value and
does not compensate. The lower threshold ultimately only vali-
dates the exercise of the police power; a regulation that created
more harm than good could not "advance" any public pur-
pose. 69
The nature of the government action and the purposes it is
to serve create distinctions between regulations. The closer a
regulation comes to protecting core communal values, the more
likely it is to be upheld. At some point, the action to be curbed
- Tulk v. Muxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng.Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
67 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; but see, not needed if preventing harm, Id.
at 422 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). See also, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143-47 (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting). (Compensation unnecessary "under a comprehensive land use plan, [which]
benefited as well as burdened for average reciprocity"). Although Rehnquist found no
reciprocity in Penn Central, Justice Brennan did. From Brennan's description of the
landmark preservation act's purpose, one wonders how a railroad company, which gains
from travel, could ever have objected. Id. at 109.
" Compare, Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922): "The exercise of
[police power without compensation is] . . . warranted in some cases by what we may
call the average reciprocity of advantage, although the advantages may not be equal in
the particular case." with Epstein, supra note 41, at 22-23 (nothing protected by takings
clause if consider overall benefits of citizenship for reciprocity).
" See Large, supra note 47, at 24-25 (exercise of police power not valid if public
good less than private harm); Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 1065-66. See also, Wiseman,
supra note 50, at 438 (deprivation of property without due process is separate evil).
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almost becomes a theft of those values if allowed to continue.70
Alternatively, economic sensibility justifies and even demands
regulation under the reciprocity analysis .7 Modern case law adds
a key refinement. Private property has always been subject to
the law of the land and a landowner's reasonable expectations
about the use of his or her land must recognize this.
2. Modern Refinements: "Balancing" into an Expectations
Spotlight
None of the cases or approaches discussed above have been
overruled. They remain in the jurisprudential quiver of arrows.
Additional cases further distilled when a regulation would be
protected from challenge because of its social utility or be found
to have gone "too far," that is, to have created a "diminution
of value" sufficient to comprise a taking. A flurry of activity
by the Supreme Court in 1987 did not greatly disturb the existent
trends. 72 Two crucial elements underscore and explain current
jurisprudence: the nature of the governmental action and the
nature of the private party's expectations about the disturbed
'rights."
By the late 1970s, the test more openly balanced several
factors in the "too far" equation when income-producing prop-
erty was at issue: 1) the character of the governmental action;
2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and
3) the interference, if any, with investment-backed expectations.
73
10 See Michelman, supra note 31, at 1236-37. Compare, Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1980)
(hereinafter "Sax, Trust") (public trust prevents "destabilizing disappointment of ex-
pectations held in common but without formal recognition of title").
", See Wittman, supra note 57, at 74-76 (all gain from the French Quarter being
designated a historic district even if individual might net more if singly allowed to violate
norms).
" See, e.g., Sax, 1987 supra note 40; and Michelman, supra note 32. But see,
Laitos, supra note 31, at 1-4 (may signal "resurrection" of clause as check on govern-
ment). The most recent Supreme Court case continued a deferential Commerce Clause
"rational basis" test in upholding the Rails-to-Trails Act. See Presault v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n., U.S. , 110 S.Ct. at 914 (1990).
11 Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104. See generally, Myers,
Some Observations on the Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23
VAL. U. L. REV. 527, 528-37 (1989). Two cases provided variants: Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 540, 594-95 (1962), emphasized a due process analysis and Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1979), emphasized a two prong analysis, due process and
economic impact.
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When a regulation impacts many in differing ways, requiring
voluntary sales to reach regulatory objectives would entail high
transaction costs. A multifactored test, which requires judgmen-
tal balancing, is more appropriate than relying only on sales, or
its equivalent, namely, automatic compensation.74
The first element of the test looks at the character of the
governmental action. This may include aspects of the harm and
detriment calculus as well as the public use test; the crucial
question is the importance of the proposed police power exercise
to the public welfare.7" Some exigencies such as national security
can overide private concerns totally.7 6 Most goals are less all-
consuming and need closer analysis to balance the strength of
the police power assertion with the remaining two elements.
7
The second element considers how great a diminution in
value need be borne without compensation. The rote response is
that governmental activity may diminish a property's value, but
not demolish it. This maxim is deceptively simple. Confusion
abounds when courts attempt to delineate what exactly is the
affected property. Two main techniques guide these exercises:
conceptual severance, which considers each strand of property
rights individually7 and physical unity, which rejects reifying
"rights" and clings to a literally earth-based definition. 79
Some decisions forcefully reject conceptual severance and
examine the property as a whole to see whether unaffected
74 Merrill, supra note 32, at 13, 43.
7 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133, n.30. The case may have increased acceptable
goals. See, Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv.
481, 483 (1983) (must continue to confer benefit on neighbors); Costonis, supra note
32, at 480, n. 65 (broadened concept of harm to "fundamentally change the test's
content").
76 United States v. Caltex, Inc. 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (security and imminent peril
justify noncompensated destruction); United States v. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(1958) (gold mines closed in during war). These cases may be remnants of King's
"emergency" prerogatives, rather than exceptions to compensation under eminent do-
main. See Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 1067. Compare, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting)(ability
of government to restrict access to hazardous areas).
77 Costonis, supra note 32, at 499-501 (vary government's burden of proof and
level of scrutiny; "[niot all police power values are equal.")
71 Radin, supra note 41, at 1674-78 (court in Loretto and Nollan began to adopt
conceptual severence).
79 See, Michelman, supra note 32, at 1614-16 ("conceptual severance" regards
property right as estate effected rather than the "layman's thing," that is, "the conven-
tionally demarcated land parcel with its improvements containing Grand Central Ter-
minal").
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portions retain any significant value.80 A taking would exist only
if total loss of use occurs, defined as leaving the property with
no "economically viable"'" or "reasonable beneficial" 8  use.
Nevertheless, results may differ by attaching the word "prop-
erty" to differing physical attributes of land.83 Therefore, this
element as traditionally stated is less than satisfactory as a sole
determinant of liability.84 It may, however, be useful in other
respects if uniformly applied to help spread risks. The final
element of the three-part balance moves the analysis away from
the challenged regulation and is more helpful in initially deter-
mining whether a taking exists.
The last element examines not the government's current ac-
tion, but the law and general atmosphere that colored the rights
of the private party before the questioned regulation. If the
party complaining had no reasonable expectation of benefiting
from the newly prohibited action, the regulation could not be a
taking. To some extent, this conclusion parallels the rationale
that no person could maintain a nuisance. Because the law never
entitled one to continue a nuisance, the activity could be out-
lawed without liability. It also resembles another method to find
no taking occurred: declare the element of value that was inter-
fered with to have never been a part of the private estate in the
first place.
Refusing to recognize the disturbed interest as property skirts
the Fifth Amendment's interdict. The technique applies to land
riparian to navigable water. All navigable waters are subject to
an interest known as the "navigation servitude," under which
the United States has jurisdiction to control water use for power
and navigational purposes. If the United States exercises these
0 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 ("Taking
jurispudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been abrogated."); but see Key-
stone, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
83 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)
82 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
13 Compare, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir.
1984) (vacated), with the opinion on rehearing, Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. den. 480 U.S. 951 (1987). Judge Seth's
original opinion treated each blade of grass eaten by a wild horse as separate "property
taken." En banc, the Tenth Circuit examined whether the horses substantially diminished
the private owner's real estate. See also, Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122-23
(D. Nev. 1989) (taking when horses would use substantially all well's water).
" See, McFerrin & Whitman, supra note 10 at 655 (presence of alternative surface
uses could preclude takings under "no other use" reading).
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powers, no objection can be lodged. 5 No reasonable investment
backed expectation could purportedly include values subject to
the servitude.
8 6
Another line of cases underscores the central position of
expectations in takings analysis. Courts declare many interests
non-property for purposes of "takings," but recognize them as
property for due process protection. Notice and a hearing may
be necessary before changes could affect them, but these interests
command no compensation if discontinued or modified. Con-
trarily, in light of the importance of "investment backed expec-
tations" in takings analysis, they are dismissed as "mere
expectancies," rather than property.87 Therefore, investment as
opposed to expectation may be the primary focus of Fifth
Amendment analysis, 8 at least when homes or other property
imbued with personal emotion are not at issue.8 9
C. The 1986 Supreme Court Term
In 1987, several Supreme Court decisions considered regu-
latory takings. 90 In most respects, the court did not alter prior
11 United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987) (no
taking if exercise right to improve navigation); United States v. Willow River Co., 325
U.S. 499, 502 (1945); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) (just
compensation for riparian lands did not include value of location near navigable river);
Compare, Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (too
much test circumvented by calling non-property). See generally, Morreale, Federal Pow-
ers in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3
NAT. RES. J. 1 (1963); Note, Determining the Parameters of the Navigation Servitude
Doctrine, 34 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1981).
86 There might be limits to its reach, Michelman, Property as a Constitutional
Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1106-08 (1981) (Kaiser Aetna protects fundamental
right to exclude).
17 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gillard, 480 U.S. 904 (1987) (method of computing welfare
benefits); Allied-General Nuclear Services v. U.S, 839 F. 2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(license); Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (pending lease applica-
tions); Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass 786, 151 N.E.2d 475 (1958) (dower and curtesy).
Cf., VER is not "mere expectation of a right to mine," 30 C.F.R. 5761.5(a) (1979)
(emphasis added). For classification of rights to use public lands, see, generally, Laitos
& Westfall, supra note 17, and Barkeley & Albert, supra note 26.
11 See, Note (Massey), Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541,
555-60 (1984) (traditional rights stabilize control of productive resources and promote
efficiency).
89 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (no investment backed expectation in
being able to will their property, but still protect right). See also, St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York, 728 F.Supp. 958, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (restriction a taking
if it would prevent or seriously interfere with carrying out of charitable purpose).
10 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
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law extensively. Some members of the court are willing to ac-
tively review legislative choices, but when strict environmental
protection as opposed to environmental enhancement was at
issue, deference to legislatively imposed solutions continued. The
importance of the police power objective remains a distinguish-
ing characteristic. 9'
Two of the decisions did restrain government regulation.
One case, Hodel v. Irving,92 almost re-adopted Holmes's pro-
clivity to examine what fragment of property the regulation
affects and to declare a taking if it totally thwarts the limited
interest. Property management was inefficient because of the
large numbers of co-tenants in Native American allotments. To
rectify the problem, a statute targeted certain small undivided
interests and made them impossible to devise or pass by descent;
they would escheat to the tribe to consolidate title. 93 Justice
O'Conner did not view the property's usefulness to be land per
se; she considered each small undivided interest individually and
found each too greatly devalued. The statute disturbed a fun-
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704; and
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304.
For additional takings case, see FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987). See
also, California Coastal Commision v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (state envi-
ronmental controls on unpatented mining claims).
91 Available remedies changed. Prior to First English Evangelical Lutheran Church,
if a regulation was a taking, an injured party could only invalidate the offending law.
San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.
dissenting). The landowner received no compensation for the time during which the
unconstitutional law demanded compliance. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
recognized possible damages for a "temporary" taking, measured by the time the law
was presumptively valid and "worked a taking of all use of property." First English,
482 U.S. at 319.
Agencies might become less aggressive in protecting the environment. Executive
Order No. 12,630, "Government Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Pro-
tected Property Rights," 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988). This might not have been Justice
Brennan's desired end. What incensed the Justice earlier was that government would
suffer no censure from enacting a series of blatantly unconstitutional provisicns to
achieve a forbidden end. San Diego Electric Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S. at 655, n. 22
(Brennan, J. dissenting). See also, Nollan, 483 U.S. at 849 (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(Brennan's damage position conflicts with desire for regulatory flexibility in Nollan);
and Epstein, supra note 41 at 28-31 (absolute liability preferred to total lack of con-
straints; good faith standard possible).
92 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (sole use of severed mineral estate is coal removal); compare
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414; see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J.
dissenting) (adopts and argues for same severance).
91 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 704 (1987) For background on Indian land issues, see Note,
Hodel v. Irving: The Supreme Court's Emerging Takings Analysis - A Question of How
Many Pumpkin Seeds per Acre, 18 Et, VTL. L. 597, 606-613 (1988).
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damental element of property: the right to dispose thereof. 94
Hodel, however, presented an unusual opportunity to engage in
conceptual severence; the land already had undivided interests
and the statute specifically aimed at the subdivisions. 91
The second case, Nollan v. California Coastal Commn',96
also does not impact government regulation as greatly as might
initially appear. As a condition for a building permit, the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission required the Nollans to provide pub-
lic access across the beach on their property to link together two
public beaches. The Court second guessed governmental intent
and the means chosen to achieve its ends; to uphold the regu-
lation required a clear nexus between the evil to be avoided and
the land use restraint imposed. This did not exist. 97 This "nexus"
requirement could signal tighter control of regulatory power, but
for the fact that the agency actually sought an easement for
public use across residential property.
The Nollan case reveals three circumstances that previously
commanded solicitude for private interests. First, the Court be-
lieved something close to physical occupation of land would
occur, a result declared to be a taking no matter how trivial the
impact on the landowner. 9 An easement allows physical inva-
sion, albeit not continual, but pursuant to a permanent right:
"[tlo say the appropriation of a public easement across a lan-
downer's premises does not constitute a taking of a property
interest but rather . . 'a mere restriction on its use' . . . is to
use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary
meaning.,99
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716. The Justices disagree on whether the opinion affects
Andrus v. Allard, discussed supra at note 80. Id. at 718 (Brennan, J. concurring, with
Blackmun and Marshall) (no); Id. at 719 (Scalia, J. concurring with Rehnquist and
Powell) (limits prior case to its facts).
91 The Rails-to-Trails Act similarly targeted a subdivision of property rights; a
reversionary interest could be burdened by changing the condition that makes it posses-
sory. In a recent attack on the statute, three Justices found that if the Act displaces
state-defined property rights, a taking may occur. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also, National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 850 F.2d at 704-06 (postponement of reversion
indefinitely may be a taking). On the meaning of Hodel v. Irving, see also, Note, supra
note 93, at 631, ("occupation" could result because tribe received control).
Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
91 Id. at 831.
11 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430-35 (permanent physical occupation a taking while
temporary invasion not always one).
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. This extends "occupation" to more than filling space
1989-901
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The remaining two circumstances limiting Nollan's impact
are the type of property involved and the setting in which the
regulation was imposed. The Coastal Commission demanded the
access right as a condition to grant a building permit for a
residence. Therefore, the case relates more to subdivision exac-
tion cases than traditional restraint of use cases. Compulsory
land dedication always required a stronger connection between
governmental demand and social concern.100 Finally, the condi-
tion affected a residence, not a business already open to invi-
tees.' 0' A home receives greater protection than more fungible
investment property. 0 2 The case does not necessarily indicate a
new regime of enhanced scrutiny for all regulatory actions. 03
permanently:
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for purposes
of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right
to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed,
even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself per-
manently upon the premises.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832. See also, Seawall Associates v. New York City, 74 N.Y. 2d
92, 542 N.E. 2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S. 2d 542 (1989) (prohibiting demolition of single room
occupancy structures plus rent control constitutes physical taking). Pinewood Estates v.
Barnegat Township, 898 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1980) (lack of vacancy decontrol transforms
rent control law to permanent possessory transfer). But see, ABN 51st Partners v. City
of New York, 724 F. Supp. 1142, 1153-57 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) (low rental set-asides not
physical taking).
' See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 32, at 492-93. But see, Epstein, supra note 41,
at 39-40 (Justice Scalia did not go far enough in importing unconstitutional conditions
theory into eminent domain analysis). Cf., W.J. Jones Insurance Trust v. Fort Smith,
731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (cannot condition permit on easement grant unless
change of land use would increase traffic).
,01 See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74 (no taking when law required shopping center
to be open to free speech). Oregon v. Cargill, 786 P.2d 209 (Or. 1990) (no taking when
petition gatherers use store's sidewalk). Cf., Lorreto, 458 U.S. at 436. ("[A]n owner
suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's
property.") (emphasis in original). But see, Wiseman, supra note 50 at 455 (PruneYard
more accurately a rejection of a remedy, not lack of taking).
02 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 41, at 1687-89 (1988) (property imbued with person
entitled to greater protection); Costonis, supra note 32, at 468-69 (dominion right
upgrades property protection for noneconomic values); Rodgers, Bringing People Back:
Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 EcOL. L. Q.
205, 208 (1982) (substantive due process limits legislative power for core "human"
property). But see, Lorretto, 458 U.S. at 439 (fact property held for rental irrelevant).
03 In Preseault, the Supreme Court continues a "rational relationship" test under
the Commerce Clause for an act that would result in easement acquisition. Preseault,
_ U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990) (legislation involves trade-offs). Traditional
doctrine on reviewing regulation requires some review of legislative means but does not
require fine tuning. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 413-14 (regulation need not exactly fit
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The final important takings case of the 1986 term emphasizes
that a delicate balancing of interests remains on center stage.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictisl°M contains cir-
cumstances as closely analogous to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon'0 as possible. Both cases appraised Pennsylvania statutes
requiring coal to remain underground to prevent subsidence of
private residences. Both involved parties who owned severed
mineral estates.1°6 The holdings, however, were anything but
identical: the 1987 court found no taking where the 1922 court
had found a regulation that went "too far" because it totally
destroyed the property's viable use. Nevertheless, the second case
did not overrule the first. It distinguished the cases on two major
counts.
First, the majority found a clearer public purpose in the
second statute.10 7 The dissent details the similarities between the
two statutes and is correct in categorizing any literal distinction
as flawed. 10 But to come to that conclusion is not to fault the
majority's result. Societal perceptions about the problems ad-
dressed are more important than the literal wording of the
statute. In the sixty-five year interim, environmental issues have
changed the context to Brandeis's vision rather than that of
Holmes: the problem is not simply that of one private residence
versus one private coal mine. Government must be able to act
to protect the environment, including avoiding externalities of
activities such as mining. 1°9
conditions or be the least harsh); compare, Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661:
If ... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial
relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge....
Modern cases also allowed review. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (taking of particular property
occurs by zoning "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests."). For an argument that Nollan represents a more vigorous approach, see,
e.g., Laitos, supra note 31. See also, Crowe-New Jersey 32 Ltd. v. Township of Clinton,
718 F.Supp. 378, 384-85 (D. N.J. 1989) (Nollan a substantive due process test).
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
03 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
For general information on relationships between mineral and surface owners,
see Mansfield, supra note 39.
107 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492 (prevents actions similar to public nuisance). See,
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 561, 580 (1984) (act has no broad public purpose and is redistributive).
Im Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J dissenting).
,01 Udall, supra note 5. Note, Keystone Bituminous Coal v. BeBenedictis, 7 UCLA
J. EN VTL. L. & POL'Y 185 (1988) (environmental concern tips balance for public).
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The second revision to the calculus was what property the
regulation affected. Holmes had narrowly viewed the impacted
interest as being the right to mine coal without liability; the
statute took a distinct negative easement that the coal company
had in the surface. °10 The modern court acknowledged that a
severed mineral estate existed but refused to either separate the
support estate from the general mineral estate or to segment the
latter into individual tons of coal. The question was whether the
regulation was so great an interference that it rendered the
mineral producing property as a whole uneconomical. "' The
property as a whole was the coal owned by the complaining
companies.
Despite the fact that Keystone did not change the general
wording of the takings tests, the majority opinion has a greater
symbolic import than mere continuation of prior practice. It
sanctions what an earlier case had not allowed. The dissent
reveals some members of the Court ready to curb governmental
regulation by strictly looking at the particular interest interfered
with; each stick in the bundle of property rights would require
separate analysis.1'2 Nevertheless, the 1986 term emphasized that
regulation clearly aimed at the prevention of activity that would
degrade the collective environment is not a taking." 3
A comparison of the two cases in which controls on devel-
opment were at issue underscores the importance of the police
power objective. Nollan, unlike Keystone, dealt with a discrete
easement that could efficiently be purchased. A strong concur-
rence in the recent case of Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Commission"4 emphasized that appropriation of a public ease-
"' See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 32, at 536, n. 291 (extinguishing negative easement
equivalent to physical invasion).
"I Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496: "We do know, however, that petitioners have never
claimed that their mining operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable
since the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific
location . . . . has been unprofitable." The Court did not address the possibility of
alternative uses for the surface.
12 Id. at 517-28 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). The battle between Brandeis and
Holmes continues, with Rehnquist taking up the Holmesian banner of conceptual sev-
erance. Rehnquist, like Holmes, would allow regulation if reciprocity or nuisance is
involved.
"I Cf., Laitos, supra note 31, at 1-37 (Keystone takes nuisance exception to extreme
and could render land-use and environmental regulations immune to challenge).
"I Preseault, - U.S. - , 110 S.Ct. 914 (1990).
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ment would be a taking and require compensation." '5 Keystone,
conversely, dealt with both diffuse harm and diffuse benefits.
1 1 6
In addition to confirming that strength of purpose can validate
regulation without compensation, the Court's treatment of the
"too much" equation looked at broad ownership patterns. This
spreads the cost of protection from such harm and militates
against costly compensation.
III. "TAKINGS TEST" WOULD NOT GENERALLY PROTECT
INDUSTRY
A. General Expectations Include Regulation
It has been alleged that a "takings test" for valid existing
rights would be more lenient than other definitions.11 7 It would
not, however, preserve many private claims. Mining may fairly
easily be precluded without compensation. First, the public pur-
pose behind the SMCRA prohibitions is strong."' Second, the
coal developer's expectations must include the almost universal
need to regulate the mining industry for environmental protec-
tion. The key to the second factor is the reasonableness of any
investment-backed expectations the coal owner might have about
development.
This component of the takings test harks back to Jeremy
Bentham's definition of property as the expectation of deriving
this or that advantage due to control over a thing."i 9 It reflects
I Id. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, wrote to express
a disagreement with the Second Circuit's approach, which might have allowed easement
acquisition without compensation.
116 This creates a need to protect "public rights", see, e.g., Sax, Takings, Private
Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 151 (1971) (hereinafter Sax I); and
further increasing transaction costs of voluntary acquisition, Merrill, supra note 32. See
also, Myers, supra note 73, at 558 (essential compromises of Penn Central intact).
"I See, e.g., McFerrin & Whitman, supra note 10 at 664 (flexibility may allow
administrators to allow more mining); Barkeley & Albert, supra note 26, at 9-53 (Whitney
Benefits considered taking without any permit, existing mining, or substantial commit-
ment); The Stearns Co., 110 I.B.L.A. 345, 359 n. 7 (Burski, J. dissenting) (good faith-
all permits more restrictive).
"I SMCRA § 101, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982). See also McFerrin & Whitman, supra
note 10, at 653 (mining prohibition in limited areas not arbitrary on record before
Congress); McGinley & Barrett, supra note 7, at 435 (spillover analysis upholds SMCRA).
J9 . BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (4th ed. 1882):
The idea of property consists in an established expectation .... Now this
expectation . . . can only be the work of law. I cannot count upon the
enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except through the promise of
the law which guarantees it to me .... Property and law are born together
and die together.
1989-90]
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Blackstone's acknowledgment that the laws of the land limit
individual dominion of property.120 In some shorthands, too
great an impingement on investment-backed expectations be-
comes the sine qua non of a taking.' One influential article on
takings aptly summarized the interrelationship of the "diminu-
tion of value test" with expectations:
[T]he test poses not so loose a question of degree; it does not
ask 'how much,' but rather (like the physical-occupation test)
it asks 'whether or not': Whether or not the measure in ques-
tion can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant
of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystalized, investment-
backed expectation.1
22
What is "reasonable" to anticipate about property is crucial.
The first important premise is that the anticipation of yet
unrealized profit is one of the least protected aspects of property
ownership:
Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned
speculation that courts are not especially competent to per-
form. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the
interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as
less compelling than other property-related interests. 23
Public needs may justify regulation that interferes with such
aims even if the power to profit from property "fortunately
W. Blackstone, supra note 2, at 2.
z See State of Utah v Andrus, 488 F.Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979).
' Michelman, supra note 31, at 1233. The use of "crystaline" to describe expec-
tations presages a later article, which labels "hard-edged rules" as "crystals." These
purportedly form the basis of property law and Bentham-required expectations, but the
article traces how they often are riddled by exceptions and equitable doctrines to become
"mud." Law then turns again to "crystals" by positing new rules. Rose, supra note 25.
Professor Rose ascribes the progression to "rule overload": sensible rules in one situation
are inappropriately used in another and thus forced to change. Id. at 600. Both types
of doctrines can serve social goals and assist predictability. Compare, Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1773-74 (1976)
("rules" control "bad men," while "standards" promote goodness and altruism).
123 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. at 66. See also, Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 903:
By dispensing with the fair market value test in determining the occurence
of a taking, it makes the case improperly one to recover for frustration of
business expectations. A taking is founded on the fact that Florida Rock
is prevented from doing a profitable business in the extraction and sale of
its limestone. Yet frustration of performance of even an existing contract
is not a taking of contract rights, still less a hope of future profitable
contracts.
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situated [is] a right usually incident to property."' 24 Not all
"economic advantages" are property rights: "only those eco-
nomic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them,
and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others
to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion."1
25
The preceding statement implies that it is unreasonable to
expect protection until the court says the questioned interest is
one entitled to protection. This circularity leads to the proverbial
chicken and egg dilemma in some situations. Moreover, legal
classification can also defy the logic of the market; elements
deemed "non-property" by courts do enter into private pricing
decisions. 126
If profit is to come from mining, however, the regulatory
climate over such activity would determine whether a reasonable
expectation of development could exist and then be subject to
interference. If minerals were acquired knowing that restraints
were imminent, the imposition of the restraints should not trigger
compensation. 27 A direct analogy exists: value traceable to the
' Block, 256 U.S. at 157 (Holmes, J.):
But while it is unjust to pursue such profits from a national misfortune
with sweeping denunciations, the policy of restricting them has been em-
bodied in taxation and is accepted. It goes little farther than the restriction
put upon the rights of the owner of money by the more debatable usury
laws.
See also, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). (tenant financial hardship may
effect rent control) and Florida Power Corp, 480 U.S. at 245 (regulation of charges for
access to utility poles). See also, Sax I, supra note 33, at 54-60 (protecting economic
advantage neither consistent with early history of compensation principle or contempo-
raneous history of amendment); but see, Stoebuck, supra note 33, at 1075-77 (Sax fails
to recognize the tyranny he describes is destruction of property).
,25 United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). For an extension
of this view in the rate-making arena, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barash, - U.S.
- 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989) (may exclude from rate base investments reasonable when
made but not actually used to provide power).
11 For example, private ranches gain value from being base lands for permits under
the Taylor Grazing Act. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1982) (so-called "Section 3 permits"); United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 490 (buyer of fee lands considers use of federal lands for
fair market value). The Supreme Court, however, in a five to four decision, found
Congress had clearly stated that no private expectation could attach to use of the lands.
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 489 (permits "shall not create any right, title, or
estate in or to the lands" and therefore cannot compensate for value they add to base
property). See also, Bigelow v. Michigan Dept. Of Natural Resources, 727 F. Supp. 346,
352-53 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (commercial fishing permits gave no right to fish superior to
Indian treaty rights).
27 Cf., Izaak Walton League, 353 F. Supp. at 710-11 (leases acquired after pres-
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improvement for which the property is being acquired is not
included in the value of the property "taken" when just com-
pensation is computed. 128 The United States also should not pay
for a regulation's affect on minerals acquired knowing that they
never could be produced. This is not to say that once a VER is
established, it could not be transferred. The initial acquisition
or investments for mining must represent a bona fide expectation
of mining. The so-called developer should not simply be gam-
bling on payment from the government rather than planning
production.
Mining has been regulated extensively over the years. 129 The
past sixty-five years shows increased regulation and therefore
decreased expectation of freedom to develop. 30 In fact, an un-
patented mining claim, traditionally deemed a form of property,
recently was classified as a mere right to a stream of income,
thus testing regulation of it by the less demanding standard used
for economic matters. 3' Federal statutes such as the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act 32 underscore the new status
of mining as a regulated industry: it clearly amended the Mining
ervation intent clear) Compare, Michelman, supra note 31, at 1238 (land acquisition
knowing scenic easement soon to be enforced). But see, Blume & Rubinfeld, Compen-
sation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 587 (1984) (seller,
not purchaser, injured if regulatory risk lowered purchase price), and Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 833-34 n. 2 (prior owners "transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lot.") The last statement presumes, perhaps, that the price had not been discounted
because if it had, the real party in interest would be the sellers.
11 The United States need not buy at the price "Boomtown" homesites will
command after its dam is built in the desert. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377
(1943) ("[Oiwners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due
to the Government's activities").
"I9 As noted by the Interior Board of Land Appeals, some states have been active
since 1906. Valley Camp, 112 I.B.L.A. at 34. See also, Dernbach, Pennsylvania's
Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of
How "Cooperative Federalism" can Make State Regulatory Programs More Effective,
19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 903, 909-11, 920-21 (1986) (history of regulation in Pennsylvania).
110 Compare, defense of Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, Atlas Cor-
poration v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 758 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (those doing business in
regulated field cannot object if amendments butress legislative end). Wetlands regulation
may create another genre of property for which a party might not reasonably anticipate
free development rights. Crow-New Jersey 32 Ltd., 718 F.Supp. at 384. See generally,
Blumm & Zahela, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory
Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
695, 754-60 (1989).
3 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985); criticized in, Barkeley & Albert,
supra note 26, at 9-14 - 9-18.
M Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (codified as 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1982)).
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Law of 1872 to allow the BLM to regulate mining to prevent
"unnecessary or undue degradation." ' Although the current
Supreme Court has been characterized as pro-development, cases
on mining did not enter this computation.
13 4
Mining may no longer be a "bully" destroying surface values
with no compunction. Whether this past characterization of the
industry was correct or responsive to society's needs is immate-
rial: it colored takings analysis.' It also changed relationships
between mineral and surface owners in many situations, either
by judicial effort or legislation. 3 6 For example, some states
passed statutes requiring payment for damages to the surface
estate caused by oil and gas operations that were previously
. FLPMA § 302, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1982). On the public lands, the state and
federal government may regulate for environmental protection. California Coastal Comm'n
v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 572. One commentator claimed this case changed mining
from a preferred use to simply one among many. Leshy, Granite Rock and the State's
Influence over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L. 99, 125-26 (1988). The change, however,
came much earlier. See generally, Mansfield, supra note 39. Mining has been a suspect
category unless oil shale had been involved. See, Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657
(1980) (oil shale exception to "valuable mineral" requirement of Mining Law); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980) (oil shale exception to
NEPA). For some reason, the courts seemed adamant that oil shale development would
save the western world.
'1 Levy & Glickman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's
Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 345 n. 5 (1989). Similarly, for
all the concern about statutes that target distinct property interests, Dormant Mineral
Acts were upheld. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
"I Cf., Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753
(1988):
Takings doctrine is generated not by any abstract methodological or the-
oretical concern, but by the pictures that judges have in their heads about
the participants in the public land-use planning arena, pictures about who
is empowered, who is unempowered and how those who enjoy a power
monopoly have used the power to their strategic advantage.
For the "text" as applied to coal mining, consider Eichbaum and Buente, The Land
Restoration Provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Constitu-
tional Considerations, 4 HAzv. EN vL. L. REv. 227 (1980).
116 See, generally, Mansfield, supra note 39; Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the
Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REv. 871, 915-16 (1980)
(possibly no reasonable expectation to destroy or substantially interfere with surface).
Compare, response to allegation that Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Controla Act
interfered with investment backed expectations:
The only "expectation" that Western Nuclear could have under the cir-
ucumstances it has alleged is that it expected it would not have to spend
its own money to remediate health and environmental hazards created by
its prodution of uranium. Such an expectation cannot be a reasonable
commercial expectation.
Atlas Corp., 745 F.2d at 758.
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within an implied or express easement of use already purchased.
These have withstood taking challenges, being characterized as
mere rearrangements of tort liability 3 7 or minor adjustments in
a bundle of rights. 138
Merely because an action was not prohibited in the past does
not foreclose future control: "The submission that ... a 'taking'
[is established] simply by a showing that they have been denied
the ability to exploit a property interest that they had heretofore
believed was available for development is quite simply untena-
ble."'3 9 Justice Holmes provided a similar caution: "Such words
as 'right' are a constant solicitation to fallacy". 14° Public needs
color and modify private actions.
The almost all-encompassing requirements of varied environ-
mental laws fetters the expectation of coal development.' 41 Ad-
ditionally, mining creates difficulties such as pollution and
subsidence that resemble the subject matter of traditional nui-
sance law. Because of both the history and nature of the prob-
11 Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 729 F.2d 552, 558 (8th Cir. 1984); Davis
Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1986). See also, Lowe, Development in Non-
Regulatory Oil and Gas Law: Issues of the Eighties, 35 OIL & GAS LAW INST. 1, 21-39
(1984) (constitutional).
"I Murphy, 729 F.2d at 557 ("Amoco's right to not compensate Murphy for
unavoidable damage to Murphy's surface estate, if indeed it is 'property' at all, amounts
to a minor strand in the full bundle of rights which constitutes Amoco's mineral estate").
"I Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. Justice Harlan's voice echoes: " [Although the
brewery was legal when builti, the State did not thereby give any assurance, or come
under an obligation, that its legislation upon that subject would remain unchanged."
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. See also, Justice McKenna:
A vested interest cannot be asserted against ... [exercise of the police
power) because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must
be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must
yield to the good of the community.
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410.
His views in this case, which involved externalities from a brickyard, differ greatly from
his traditional Lockean stance in the rent control cases. Block, 256 U.S. at 158-170
(dissent, McKenna J.). See Bender, supra note 41, at 765, n. 122 (McKenna's atypical
alignment in Hadacheck because wealthy suburbanites objected to private uses).
1' Jackman, 260 U.S. at 31. See also, PruneYard, 447 U.S. as 93 (Marshall, J.
concurring) (due process does not require a freezing of common law property rights).
See also, Murphy, 729 F.2d at 558 (if change in liability equals a taking, "any new rule
of state law requiring a tortfeasor to compensate those he harms would constitute a
taking"); accord, Davis Oil Co., 766 P.2d at 1350. See generally, Sax, The Limits of
Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENvTL. L. 473, 476-79 (1989) (historical changes in
water needs).
14, Laitos, supra note 31, at 1-1 - 1-3; McFerrin & Whitman, supra note 10, at 660
(broad expectations test would find no right to continue negative externalities).
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lems addressed, regulatory action may embody a balancing of
harms and detriments similar to nuisance resolution. 42 Refusing
to find a taking if mining is precluded after the balancing would
be easier to justify based on private expectations than uncom-
pensated preclusion of other activities.
B. An Alternative Analysis: Risks Spreading
Despite the general status of expectations about mining,
failure to compensate when mining is totally denied may chal-
lenge a sense of fairness. The diminution of value and balancing
tests have the fulcrum of reasonable expectation, but they also
have a quantitative side. This dual nature allows compliance
with some intuitive idea of fairness; so long as the affected party
still retains a thing of value or was forewarned that all might
not be as desired, the burden of forwarding the public good will
not be overly onerous. Concern with spreading the risks and
costs of regulation is central to Fifth Amendment analysis.
One approach to takings previously noted was to manipulate
the definition of the "property" the regulation affects. Standard
responses and some tentative definitions may offer a way to
temper the denial of valid existing rights status in some in-
stances. 4 A takings-oriented definition of VER could employ
this technique for distributional fairness.
Passage of a mining prohibition alone does not trigger a
taking.144 Takings analysis has required a case by case application
of site specific questions. Generally, courts speak of the totality
of the regulated operation. 45 The simple fact that some mineral
,41 Willowbrook Mining Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 499 A.2d 2 (1985)
(no entry or occupation of property but "adjust[s] benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote common goods" quoting, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Van Alystne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,
44 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1970) (regulatory objectives similar to nuisance control
more easily accepted).
1' Professor Costonis offers a different conception of what "too much" means.
A regulation would go "to far" either because the due process analysis showed no
linkage, or "if the burden it imposes is greater than necessary to implement legislative
goals previously adjudged fair in principle under the due-process-takings analysis."
Costonsis, supra note 32, at 496.
11 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 294-96. See also, United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985) (assertion of regulatory
authority not a taking; must prevent "economically viable use").
143 See, e.g., Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (need
specific review of development by non-prohibited methods and of whether remaining
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might be unmineable would not render the regulation unconsti-
tutional. The Supreme Court's recent opinion may have taken
this one level further.
In Keystone, the Supreme Court correctly rejected extreme
hairsplitting. Each ton of coal was not an individual piece of
property that the mining ban could render valueless. 14 Even
without governmental requirements, no mine plan, no matter
how efficient, anticipates recovery of all the resource. 147 If,
however, the restriction so transforms mine development that it
cannot proceed at all profitably, then a taking could occur under
classic diminution of value theory unless one of two situations
were present. First, the restriction must not be a part and parcel
of the interest at the time of creation.141 Second, non-mining
uses must not be relevant.
49
While looking at the particular impact of the regulation on
the operation of a complainant has some appeal, it allows for
disparate treatment. If two coal companies have adjacent hold-
ings, a prohibition that forbids mining identical tonnage could
be a taking and require compensation in one instance but not
be a taking for the second company if mining its larger deposit
remained profitable. 50 Naturally, if surface use is also consid-
ered, additional variables abound.''
mineral could be mined); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F. 2d 1554, 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (possible to show specific tract taken by SMCRA prohibitions); Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (Oct. 13, 1984) (compensation ordered
but appeal pending).
I" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 475. See also, Id. at 498 (2% of total coal which must
remain in place is not "separate parcel of property").
'14 Room and pillar mining generally requires mineral to remain in place. Surface
pits are designed to recover the most mineral and handle the least amount of overburden.
Mineral at the outer boundaries of the deposit therefore will not be recovered. See,
Eichbaum and Buente, supra note 135, at 249; Lear, Multiple Mineral Development
Conflicts: An Armageddon in Simultaneous Mineral Operations?, 28 ROCKY Mvr. MIN.
L. INST. 79, 81-89 (1988). Longwall mining is an underground mining technique referred
to as a fully extractive technique. See, 1988 Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374. The Supreme
Court rejected its classification as "fully" extractive. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 475.
"I See, supra notes 85-86.
,,9 An alternative rescue has been hinted at by the Supreme Court: nonmining
viable uses for the land could preclude compensation. See, Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining, 452 U.S. at 296, n. 37.
10 Cf., Large, supra note 47, at 43-44 (treatment in many wetlands regulation cases
would differ for "similar but not identical harm" when one landowner's total property
was restricted but the other retained some developable acreage). See also, Whitman &
McFerrin, supra note 10 at 662 (state could find individual economic analysis required).
"I Florida Rock Industries, 791 F.2d at 902 ("Mineral land in the mountains or
deserts may well be foreseen to have no future use except for production of minerals.
This land [near Miami, Florida] is different.").
1989-901 TAKINGS, EXPECTATIONS AND VER
To ascertain whether the statute caused a taking, the Key-
stone court did not mention surface use, but also did not nec-
essarily limit itself to impact on individual mines; it may be
proper to examine all the coal the companies owned. 15 2 Increas-
ing the scope of the analysis to minerals in other locales could
again create disparate treatment, but would look beyond the
vagaries of one mineral deposit. The resulting difference in
treatment, however, need not be anathema.
To a certain extent, measuring "property" in this manner
could promote asset shuffling to exploit the government's liabil-
ity for compensation.'53 If holdings have not been rearranged
purposefully, however, disparate treatment might not be an evil
but a valid mechanism for spreading costs. 15 4 This is especially
true if "property" could be broadened beyond the particular
regulated mine-site. Multiple holdings assures that some return
on investment can occur even if some investments do not provide
the profit desired.' 55 A similar return-sensitive approach has been
hinted at by another court: judge the value of a particular mining
deposit by looking at the operation it is a part of through time.
5 6
Past productive mining may foreclose a taking because the prop-
erty as a whole had value. The inability to mine some of the
tract in the future may be only a slight diminution in value.
1 i 7
"2 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496. Because the Court is commenting on the total lack
of evidence, no positive determination of what evidence the court would require is
possible. Importantly, the Court did not mention the possibility of non-mining uses of
the property. This analysis will similarly ignore that complication.
" Compare, Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J. dissenting): "I
would suppose no one would contend that by selling his interest above 100 feet from
the surface he could prevent the State from limiting, by the police power, the height of
structures in a city. And why should a sale of underground rights bar the State's
power?" See, McGinley & Barrett, supra note 7, at 437-39 (to give more rights to one
who owns less shows how absurd it is to apply diminution of value to uses).
,14 Cf., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 30, at 1702-1705 (compensate if all wealth is
taken; individual might receive compensation when corporation would not).
"I Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 127, at 606-12 (compensate relatively large losses
for those unable to insure against such losses; large investors purchase numerous in-
vestments, all of which are risky independent of taking possibility and collectively become
self-insurance). Naturally, even with other resources, noncompensated regulation could
make entrepreneurs more cautious and hinder capital formation. But, the result could
also foster improved mining methods by creating incentives to avoid the costs imposed
by uncompensated bans. Sax II, supra note 116, at 177-186. See also, Fischel & Shapiro,
A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. OF L. &
ECON. 115, 124 (1989) (must consider expected behavior of government as well as private
decision makers).
16 Cogar, 371 S.E.2d at 326.
157 Id.
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Another measure of the "property" regulated could also
spread costs. Nature provides a unit: the mineral deposit itself.
If its recovery becomes uneconomic, then a taking would occur.
Environmental regulation could ignore artificial boundaries of
ownership. Precedent for this exists for oil and gas development.
Protection of correlative rights demands occasional exceptions
from spacing requirements to enable each owner to recover his
or her fair share of the pool, but no exception locations are
available to develop small tracts voluntarily severed from larger
ones. 158 Divided ownership of a mineral deposit, however, may
have occurred from other than voluntary division of a larger
holding.
To use the entire deposit as a focus for profitability, each
owner of a part would need to share in the whole. For oil and
gas, this is not difficult. Because of the fugaceous character of
the resource once a reservoir is tapped, unitization is common.
Owners share in both the costs and proceeds of production.
Most producing states allow for forced unitization in the interest
of conservation; more may ultimately be recovered from orderly
development than from a race to individually capture the greatest
amount of the common resource. 159
Solid minerals are different. Unitization is thus less frequent
6°
and not justified as a method to increase each individual's share
from joint effort. Two strong policy goals, however, could jus-
tify the rearrangement of private shares: minerals need to be
recovered and certain collective values must be protected. Nat-
urally, forced joinder will multiply production difficulties if
participants' priorities, financial capabilities, and engineering
preferences differ. 16'
These proposals to allow a VER under takings analysis for
some mineral owners but not others or to force joint develop-
ment may seem to denigrate independent entrepreneurial spirit
or violate fundamental notions that similarly situated persons
,' Texas Rule 37 procedures. TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 3.37(g) (1984).
See, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932)
(no party may commit waste); Northwest Central Pipeline v. State Corp. Commission
of Kansas, (1989) (regulations within state powers); Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Commission,
92 P. 2d 773 (Wyo. 1982).
60 But see, statute providing for forced unitization of small tracts of uranium,
N.M. STAT. ANN. 69-9 (1978).
161 See, Adams, Unitization of Solid Mineral Properties, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INsT. 733, 737 (1978) (avoid unitization if possible).
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must be similarly treated. To compensate or find a VER for a
small mineral company but not a large one might seem "unfair"
from the viewpoint of the large company. However, the two
companies are not truly similarly situated; the impact on the
small company will be much more drastic. Hard facts do create
hard law.
The optimal arrangement would be for the nation to clarify
its priorities and agree to raise enough taxes to implement them
with compensation for all parties affected. 62 Resolving our en-
vironmental dilemmas in this manner is an unlikely scenario.
The existing law, therefore, must be developed to best reach
necessary collective goals with the least disruption of the private
sphere. Some degree of wealth distribution is an inevitable result
of all regulation.
IV. STRONG EXPECTATION TEST
Generalized expectation tests make it difficult to find a tak-
ing of a mining interest. Manipulation of the "property af-
fected" could create a VER for small companies but not for
large companies. Therefore, "takings" jurisprudence itself would
not give much substance to the expressed desire to exempt more
than existing mines from the prohibition against mining in
SMCRA's Section 522(e).163 It does, however, signal how to
ascertain valid existing rights: employ an individualized test to
see if subjective "strong expectations" existed. Proof of this
expectation, however, must be by objective evidence. This test,
either alone or in conjunction with the special rules for small
operators, would best meet congressional objectives.'6
A. Objective Evidence of Expectations
Expectation analysis under takings law is sensitive to whether
an existing mine or a new prospect is to be regulated. Actual
,62 Cf., 1988 Proposal, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988) (pursuant to available and
proposed authority, Interior will seek to acquire VER in federally protected areas if
development is imminent).
163 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988). Because the prohibition "excepts"
existing mines and is "subject to valid existing rights," the latter must be broader or
superfluous.
,6 To a certain extent, the supplemental rule may be unnecessary. If the affected
property was the sole asset of a bona fide mining company, it might per force have
"strong expectations" of developing it.
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mining operations would influence expectations on both sides of
the equation. On one hand, the public would have a less rea-
sonable expectation that its values in undisturbed land would
continue. Actual mining evidences effort and expenditure toward
a specified end. Regulation may curb existing uses,' 65 but they
tend to receive more solicitude than interests that have never
been developed.
If a regulation does not disturb existing uses, it does not
endanger disbursed efforts and appears less objectionable.1
66
Holding property without development for long periods could
indicate speculation, which in itself acknowledges risks about
future events. 167 To regulate lands held as speculative reserves
more strictly than developed parcels would be less disruptive of
settled expectations.1 6 When a person uses property in a certain
manner, a specific expectation may attach to continuing that
use, which has now become an identifiable part of that proper-
ty's attributes.169 Moreover, the expectation could be judged
from objective evidence.
However, investments short of actual mining may also be a
barometer of reasonable expectations. If a regulation directly
impacts specific expenditures that would not have been made if
the regulation was in force, direct interference with investment
backed expectations is shown. The scenario in Kaiser Aetna cried
165 See, e.g., Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 394; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 590; and discussion
in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27. See also, State of Utah, 486 F. Supp. at 1004 (may
regulate more stringently for wilderness when no existent uses); St. Bartholomew's
Church, 728 F.Supp. at 966 (law contemplates continued use as in past).
66 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. But see:
It is, of course, irrelevant that appellees interfered with or destroyed
property rights that Penn Central had not yet physically used. The Fifth
Amendment must be applied with "reference to the uses for which the
property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the
community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate
future." Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1879) (emphasis added
[by Rehnquist])
Id. at 143 n. 6 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
However, adding "reasonability" and "immediacy" to protected expected future uses
forces examination of the existing regulatory and economic climate.
161 Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), reversed
on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (lengthy
failure to develop showed mineral holdings speculative).
I" City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal.3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.Rptr.
327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (public trust imposed on unfilled tracts in private
hands, not on filled tracts).
'1 Michelman, supra note 31, at 1233.
[VOL. 5:431
1989-901 TAKINGS, EXPECTATIONS AND VER
out for the private party's relief: the developer would not have
created the harbor if it could not recoup the expenditure by
controlling access. 70
What must be required is individual expectation about de-
veloping the particular coal for which valid existing right status
is sought. Substantial financial or legal commitments either look-
ing toward or relying upon mining the deposit would objectify
strong expectations as to the particular deposit. Permit applica-
tions made in good faith would definitely suffice.'71
Mere ownership of coal or ownership coupled with the right
to engage in a certain type of mining would not be sufficient to
meet this strong expectation test.' 72 All unsevered coal - that is,
coal owned in conjunction with the surface - would meet the
test. 7 3 In fact, except for severences with insufficient waivers of
subjacent support, 74 all privately owned coal would be exempted
from the prohibitions.
This is not a meaningful result despite the fact that some
members of Congress asserted that SMCRA did not intend to
modify private rights; this simply meant that existing state law
,70 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167-168, distinguished in, PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
See also, Wilkins, supra note 42, at 40-43 (Kaiser Aetna only subjective appraisal of
expectations). Justice Blackmun also examined subjective intentions in Loretto Tele-
prompter, 458 U.S. at 445, (dissent) (no expectation for income from occupied space if
unaware of cable when building purchased). See also, Fallini, 725 F. Supp. at 1122-23
(well permitted to water cattle and such use a distinct investment backed expectation).
17, The 1988 Proposal indicated "good faith would be considered made if all
necessary permits had been applied for prior to the date the prohibitions came into
effect." 53 Fed. Reg. 5,234. However, mere cursory paper filings without supporting
data and effort could be subterfuge hedges against regulation rather than actual gauges
of anticipated effort. For a description of a permit process, see Dernbach supra note
129, at 920-27. Therefore, the filings must have been a good faith effort toward diligent
development. Cf., other requirements of diligence to date rights prior to actual use or
construction, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Denver, 640 P.2d 1139
(Colo. 1982) (water right); 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(i) (definition of "commenced construction"
for New Source Performance Standards permits under Clean Air Act).
172 Legislative history interpreting "substantial legal and financial commitments"
as used in § 522(a)(6) similarly rejects counting acquisition costs. H.R. REP. No. 218,
95th Congress, 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 593,
631. See, National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 744-48.
-, Unless the proposed test anticipates express rights to mine by a particular
method, which would only occur by way of a mineral deed or lease, all coal owned with
the surface would be exempt from the prohibition. But see, McGinley & Barrett, supra
note 7, at 441 (severance crystalizes expectations between parties but not about interfer-
ence with public values).
"7 Compare, Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (W.D. Va.
1989) (clear and unequivocable waiver allows longwall mining); with, Breeding, 726 F.
Supp. at 650 (mere severence of coal insufficient waiver).
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was to determine if the threshold right to mine the coal was part
of an initial "property" allocation between private parties.'75
The Act avowedly dealt with how to mine coal; it therefore can
and must influence private development rights in regard to public
values. Even with prohibitions of Section 552(e), ownership of
coal remains undisturbed. The SMCRA is similar to zoning: it
tells how private property may be developed to accord with
overall societal needs.
The ownership and authority to mine approach would render
the protections of 522(e) close to meaningless; the basic thrust
of the statute was to render some lands off limits. 1 '7 6 Conversely,
limiting evidence of developmental plans to permit applications
would tighten valid existing rights language beyond its traditional
scope."7
B. Conformity with Spirit of Valid Existing Rights
Valid existing rights language in statutes and withdrawal
orders traditionally occurs when changes in federal law would
impact acquisition or development of federal resources.78
SMCRA's provision is not directly governed by this precedent
because it does not speak to rights vis-a-vis the government, but
to development rights universally.179 Generalization about VER
precedent is difficult.'8 0 Nevertheless, the "strong expectation"
test is within the spirit of these traditional definitions.
" E.g., "Language of 522(e) is in no way intended to affect or abrogate any
previous State court decisions," H.R. REP. No. 1522, 93rd Cong, 2nd Sess. 85 (1974).
See, discussion supra, note 18; NWF v. Lujan, 733 F. Supp. at 428 (only resort to state
law under SMCRA when directly mentioned).
176 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55. Cf., Cogar, 371 S.E.2d at 324
(construe exceptions to W. Va. statute narrowly because act designed to protect public
environment). See, National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 752 (requires priority for
non-mining uses of National Forests).
"' It would transform it to vested rights under zoning cases.
,' Laitos & Westfall, supra note 17, especially at 2 (legal changes hindering acqui-
sition or unforeseen regulation burdening after acquired); Barkeley & Albert, supra note
26; Note, supra note 10.
"I Therefore, it would be erroneous to protect simple "ownership" as is done in
other instances of valid existing rights. Privately owned resources are exempt from new
management standards applicable to federal resources under traditional valid rights
usage. See, State of Utah, 486 F. Supp. at 1009 (access to state lands required but may
restrict access to mining claim). Here, the question is not whether rights may be asserted
against the federal government, but whether changes applicable to all interests should
be imposed. But see, Note, supra note 10 at 544 (same standards as elsewhere required).
11o See, e.g., Solicitor's Opinion, M-36910, Interpretation of Section 603 of the
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The muddled precedent shows protecting valid existing rights
serves two purposes: prevent takings and promote fairness and
equity.'"' Takings jurisprudence provides the fulcrum of reason-
able expectations for analytical purposes, but does not in itself
define the VER for mining except perhaps in exceptional circum-
stances. The posited test does meet fairness and equity concerns.
It also preserves the status quo, which is a practical gloss on
VER: enable existing rights to continue but prevent the acqui-
sition of new rights.8 2
Once a coal owner or lessee takes steps directly related to
development, the mine itself could be viewed as part of the
status quo. Well-developed case law under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") Is3 requires analysis of
cumulative impacts, which include those from reasonably fore-
seeable development. ' " There must be some firm indication of
potential development beyond mere speculation to trigger the
requirement.8 5 Similarly, after an indication of strong develop-
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 - Bureau of Land Management
Wilderness Study, 86 I.D. 89 (1979) and M-36910 (Supp.), The Bureau of Land Man-
agement Wilderness Review and Valid Existing Rights, 88 I.D. 909 (1981).
" Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), Ramstad v. Hodel, 756 F. 2d
1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985); Peterson v. Dept. of Interior, 510 F.Supp. 777, 783 (D.
Utah 1981) ("unfair to encourage development of coal on federal lands, with the
attendant expenditures, without giving the applicant a fair opportunity to capitalize on
his investment"); Peabody Coal v. Andrus, 477 F.Supp. 120, 123 (D. Wyo. 1979);
Williams & Brenning, 51 I.D. 225 (1925).
"2 See, e.g., Stockley, 260 U.S. at 544 ("purpose... was to save from the operation
of the order claims which had been lawfully initiated, and which, upon full compliance
... would ripen into title"); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1081 (10th Cir.1988)
(VER language in FLPMA meant to "freeze" rights); Louis J. Hobbs, 77 I.D. 5 (1970);
Williams, 51 I.D. 225; see also, Note, supra note 10 at 539 (not necessarily synonymous
with takings law).
"I Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(1982)).
114 See, generally, Mansfield, Through the Forest of the Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing Controversy Toward a Paradigm of Meaningful NEPA Compliance, 24 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 85, 118-22 (1989). See also, Council on Environmental Quality's
definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1989) (cumulative includes incremental impacts of action
"when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions"); Id. at
§ 1508.27(b)(7) ("sigificance arises if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulative significant
impact on the environment"). Compare, rule of reason employed to ascertain "cumu-
lative" hydrological impacts from existing mines, the subject mine, and "anticipated"
mines, National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 757-59.
" The closest analogy would be Cady v. Morton, 527 F. 2d 786, 795 (9th Cir.
1975) (must analyze larger mine because need its coal to meet contract obligations). See
also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 878-80 (1st Cir. 1985) (parties heading
toward defined goal of industrial park); Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d
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mental expectations, the proposed mining should be deemed part
of the status quo: both public and private expectations should
consider the mining as existent.
Fairness and equity require recognizing strongly crystalized
expectations that are backed by reasonable investment of time
or money. By firming up development plans for that particular
coal, the market would have identified the best prospects for
mining. Developers of that coal might not have reasonably an-
ticipated unfettered development, but they would not have an-
ticipated outright bans. On the public side of the equation, lands
sought to be protected by the prohibitions of 522(e) for which
plans were on the drawing board could not have reasonably been
believed to be subject to an eleventh hour reprieve.8 6 An objec-
tively proven strong expectations test best balances diverse inter-
ests.
VI. CONCLUSION
To define valid existing rights one must learn from takings
jurisprudence, but temper its conclusions with equity and fair-
ness. Because of the general state of mining regulation, a taking
of mining rights is difficult because no one can expect to be free
from regulation protecting core collective values. Expectations
of both the mineral developer and the public, however, provide
the key to valid existing rights. If a party shows a particularized
"strong" expectation of development, this status quo should be
preserved. The mine should be considered under the full regalia
of SMCRA permit requirements, not flatly prohibited.
This test does not lend itself to mechanical application. To
resolve the conflict of important rights, those of private interests
714, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1988) (agency planned actions); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521
F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (development sole justification for interchange).
I" Cf., Interior's argument that because the Act did not contemplate a person
moving a mobile home to the edge of the property being mined to prohibit mining
operations within 300 feet of the occupied dwelling, a "continually created VER" is
justified:
To allow any person the opportunity to take extraordinary means to disrupt
mining or deprive the opportunity to mine after the operator has made the
substantial investments required to obtain a permit and begin operations
is totally inconsistent with the framework of protection the act gives to
both operators and citizens (emphasis added).
Preamble to Final 1983 Rules, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312, 41,315 (1983). See also, National
Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 750.
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and collective degradation, requires judgmental balancing. 8 7 A
workable number of factors, however, could guide implemen-
tation. Strong expectations would be present if:
1. All necessary permits were obtained or applied for in good
faith;
2. Substantial financial investments other than resource acqui-
sition were undertaken;
3. Substantial legal commitments were made requiring mineral
development from the particular property;188 or
4. Other evidence of substantial efforts towards development
is present.
Naturally, if the party does not have the right to develop under
state law, then no permit could be granted. Ownership and a
right to develop under state property law concepts would also
be necessary. The Department of the Interior has the pieces of
the puzzle in its various attempts to promulgate a rule; it must
assemble them in a coherent package.
117 Cf., Merrill, supra note 32, at 14.
- See, 30 C.F.R. § 762.5 (1989); National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 748
(definition may be limited to long term contracts).
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